THE JURY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT. 301 causes as to warrant an exception to him." The itinerant method of administering justice as it developed into the nisi priiis system resulted in sending down most actions to be tried in the counties rather than at Westminster (Bl. Com. iii. 352-4) ; but in 1285, in regulating this system, it was expressly provided (St. West. II. c. 30) : Sed inquisitiones de grossis et pluribus ar- ticulis, qui magna indigeant examinatione, capiantur coram justiciariis de bands, nisi ambae partes, etc. 1 For the handling of these greater and more complicated causes, there was picked out a better class of jurymen ; or at least there was allowed to the parties themselves a considerable hand in the selec- tion. 2 As regards special juries in general, we seem to observe the transition from the older, unregulated system to the modern one soon after a case in 1724, 3 where, on a motion for a special jury in the King's Bench, and a question whether this could be had with- out consent of the parties, " the master of the office was ordered to search for precedents, and he reported that about thirty years ago there were several precedents for special juries upon trials for nice points, without the consent of the parties, but that in the last thirty years there were several motions made for that purpose, but always denied. . . . Three of the judges (out of four ) were of opinion that a special jury might be granted to try a cause at bar without the consent of the parties, but never at the nisiprius unless very good cause was shewed (and not shown here) ; there- fore, since the high sheriff is the proper officer to return juries, and there is no imputation against him . . . the court would not vary from him without the consent of the parties." There- upon, by a declaratory statute in 1730 (Stat. 3 Geo. II. c. 25, s. 15), it was enacted that either party in any case, as well criminal as civil, may have a special jury on motion 1 And so in 1699 (Lord Sandwich's case, 2 Salk. 648), per Holt, C. J. "Where there is value or difficulty, we are bound of common right to grant trials at the bar," citing this passage from Stat. West. II. 2 In 1661 (Wheeler v. Honour, I Keble, 166) we read: "which Windham, J. agreed : and trials at bar are to the end to have the most discreet persons, and therefore to clap on ordinary persons upon a tales in such cases was not fitting." In 1738 (Smith d. Dormer v. Parkhurst, Andrews, 315), on a question of granting a new trial, after a trial at bar, counsel argue : " The evidence of one or two witnesses ought not to overturn the finding of twelve gentlemen of figure and fortune, who might, too, be governed by their own knowledge." 3 The King v. Burridge, 8 Mod. 245.
