THE SUGAR BOUNTIES. 325 that incidentally certain particular members of the public receive therefrom private advantages not shared by their fellows cannot affect the propriety of the expenditure. Given a public object for which to tax, the extent and circumstances of any particular ex- penditure are matters of legislative discretion, and if exercised to the undue benefit of private persons the remedy is political. 1 An easy illustration of this second class of cases is the grant of state or municipal aid to the construction of railroads. The entire contention has been as to whether the purpose was public. It has been urged, by those who took the affirmative of the proposition, that railroads are analogous to highways. It has been pointed out that the construction of a railroad is a suffi- ciently public purpose to enjoy the benefit of the State's power of eminent domain; that the obligation of a railroad is that of a common carrier, and so subject to rights on the part of the gen- eral public ; that the tolls are subject to legislative control, and that railroads furnish means of communication essential to the public interest. It has been contended, and the contention has been largely accepted as correct, 2 that therefore, although, as the objectors allege, the direct recipient is an individual or corpora- tion, and the public money therefore goes in the first instance to swell private profits, that still the essential object is, after all, a public one. It will be noted, however, that in the leading case of Rogers v. Burlington (2 Wall. 654) a strong minority (consisting of the Chief Justice and Field, Grier, and Miller, JJ.) dissented, and further that such a power of taxation has been steadily re- sisted in many well-considered cases. 3 In Loan Association v. Topeka (20 Wall., at p. 662) it is said that " Of the disastrous consequences which have followed its recognition by the courts, and which were predicted when it was first established, there can be no doubt." It is also notorious that many States have been forced to pro- hibit or restrict such loans in their subsequent constitutions. It is generally thought, moreover, that in this class of cases the 1 Lowell v. Boston, in Mass. 454; People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452. 2 Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654; Queensbury v. Culver, 19 Wall. 83; Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U. S. 60; Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 147; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 67S; R.R. Co. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Opinion of Justices, 58 Me. 590, 604. 8 Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28; Whiting v. R.R., 25 Wise, 166; People v. Salem^ 20 Mich. 452; People v. Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499; see, also, Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94 ; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417.
