NOTES. 37 succeed if the defendant pleaded " that he was guilty of no negligence. It is rather noteworthy that Justice Denman makes no reference to Lord Blackburn's remark in Fletcher v. Rylands, above quoted. Stanley v. Powell may be considered as definitely settling the English law upon the subject ; and though no mention was made by Justice Den- man of the leading American cases, it is not too strong an inference to suppose that he must have had them in mind, and was influenced by their practical, common-sense doctrine. Employer's Liability for Injuries resulting from Defective Machinery. — It is established law that an employer is bound to use ordinary care to keep in a reasonably safe condition the place where his employees are required to work. It is equally well established that an employee assumes all risks incident to the service into which he enters. But where a negligent breach of duty on the part of the employer augments the hazards of the service, the employee may hold the employer accountable, unless, by voluntarily continuing in the employer's service, he has assumed such danger. The master is still responsible when he has been negligent, even though the negli- gence of a fellow-servant may have concurred in bringing injury on the plaintiff. It has often been asked how far a servant, the performance of whose duties becomes dangerous through the negligence of his em- ployer properly to repair the premises, is justified in relying upon his employer's promise to amend the defect, when he himself has full knowledge of the dangerous conditions which exist, and of the risk which he runs by continuing in the service. The question was sug- gested again by a dictum of Morton, J., in the case of Lewis v. N. Y. 6- N. E. R. R. Co. (26 N. E. Rep. 431). The Massachusetts court gave no decision directly upon the point, however, for the plaintiff could not testify that he had urged the defendant's superintendent to make repairs because the discharge of his own duties had become more dangerous. Most, if not all, previous cases have gone upon the ground that the servant was led to continue at his employment by the master's promise that the defect complained of should be remedied. In some of them, there is a direct request to the servant, by the master or his repre- sentative, so to continue in service. Another recent decision is that of Rogers et al. v. Ley den (26 N. E. Rep. 210), where the Indiana court held, after indorsing the propositions stated above, that the fact that the plaintiff remained in the defendant's employ after he had discovered that the risk thereof had been increased by the defendant's negligence, could not preclude recovery, where the defendant promised to remove the threatened danger. Decisions which accord with that in the Indiana case have not been founded merely upon what was thought to be a rule of public policy, but upon contracts implied from the relationship of service, allowing the servant to rely upon the master's promise, unless the danger of continuing is so great that a reasonably prudent man would not assume it. And a similar explanation is undertaken by certain leading text- writers. It is said that a servant has the same right that any one else has to complete his contract in reliance upon its original terms. The
