232 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Constitutional Law — Political Rights — Apportionment. — Plaintiffs, who are candidates for the office of member of Assembly, seek to enjoin issuing notice of election and certifying candidates thereat under an apportionment act, which they allege to be unconstitutional in that it takes away the right of equal representation. Held, a court of equity has no jurisdiction in such a matter, since it involves political rather than civil rights. Fletcher v. Tutile, 37 N. E. Rep. 683 (111.). In the light of the prevalent desire of political parties to reapportion the various States, whenever they are placed in power, and to do it very unjustly, this decision is interesting and instructive. That it is good law cannot be doubted. The " Recon- struction Acts " cases are cited, — Georgia v. Statiton, 6 Wall. 50, — and the court dis- cusses also the power, said to be given by the Constitutions of many States to the Supreme Courts thereof, to issue such injunctions. State v. Cnnniiigham, 83 Wis. 90. The language of some courts, where this power is given, is often loose, and this is spoken of as a judicial question. It is gratifying, therefore, to have a court come out squarely, and say that it is purely a political matter. Constitutional Law — Statutes — Repeal — Amendment. — Laws of 1856, c- 179. § 16, provided that "the several cities . . . which under special acts already e]ect superintendents of . . . schools, . . . shall not be included in any school commis- sioner's district." It gave the supervisors power to divide their counties, exclusive of such cities, into school districts, as they might deem advisable. Laws of 1864, c. 555, tit. ii. § 2, provided that " the districts ... as recognized in the election of commis- sioners in 1863 shall continue to be . . . the school districts . . . except as the same shall be changed by the legislature." Chapter 414, Laws of 1883, was entitled "An Act to amend section 16 of chapter 179 of Laws of 1856" (giving its title). Its first section re-enacted section 16 above "so as to read as follows," and the only alteration was a substitution — immaterial for our purpose — for the words above printed in Italics. It was held, that the Act of 1864 had neither directly nor by implication re- pealed the section of the Laws of 1856 in question. Apart from this, the Act of 1883 " was a re-enactment of the law " of 1856, " and, as an independent statute, is unaffected by considerations whether the provision of law which it purports to amend has been repealed or not by previous statutes." People ex rel. Strough v. Board of Canvassers, yi N. E. Rep. 649 (N. Y.), affirming the decision of the General Term (28 N. V. Supp. 871), where authorities are collected. Constitutional Law — Taxes — Collateral Inheritance. — Held, section i of chapter 146 of the statutes of 1893, imposing a tax upon collateral inheritances, is not a tax upon real and personal estate within the meaning of article 9, § 8, of the Consti- tution of Maine, which provides that " All taxes upon real and personal estate, assessed by authority of this State, shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the just value thereof," but it is an excise, clearly within the power of the legislature to impose. Neither is this act in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con- stitution of the United States, which prohibits any State from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." State v. Hamlin et al., 30 Atl. Rep. 76 (Me.). See Notes, p. 226, for a similar subsequent Massachusetts case. Corporations — Collateral Attack. — Held, that the corporate existence of a railroad company was not in issue in an action brought by it to condemn land. Wel- lington &• P. R. Co. Cashie&' C. Railroad Ss' Lumber Co., 19 S. E. Rep. 646 (N. C). This decision is opposed to the weight of authority upon the point. Most courts hold that, although in ordinary cases the existence of a de facto corporation cannot be questioned except in direct proceedings by the State, yet that in the exercise of the right of eminent domain its existence may be questioned by a private person. Morawetz on Private Corporations, Vol. II. § 768. Corporations — Counties — Liability for Torts. — Held, a county is not liable for injuries caused an employee at its insane asylum, by the negligence of those in charge of the asylum. Being engaged in the performance of a public duty imposed generally upon every county of the State, — the care of its insane, — it cannot be sued by a private person except under statute. Hughes v. Monroe Co., 29 N. Y. Supp. 495. A learned author declares that there is a distinction to be made between municipal corporations proper, as incorporated cities and towns, and other organizations, such as townships and counties, which are established without any express charter or act of .incorporation. The latter, termed " quasi corporations " are not liable in tort, according to the general rule, except by statute. Addison on Torts (B. & B.'s ed.), § 1526. Dillon on Mun. Corp. Vol. II. (4th ed.) §§ 948-963, lays down the above distinction and agrees with the principal case as to the liability of counties. So New York, Ensign v. Board, 25 Hun, 20, and Alamango v. Boards 25 Hun, 551, hold the
