254 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. was nonsuited. In Y. B. 2 Ed. III. 4-5, Aldeburgh (Judge of C. B. four years later) said : " If one binds oneself to another in a debt in presence of people * sans cause et sans especialtie,' never shall an action arise from this." The same doctrine is repeated in later cases in the fourteenth century.^ In the light of these authorities it seems highly improbable that Debt was ever maintainable in the king's court, unless the plaintiff could show either a specialty or a quid pro quo received by the defendant.^ In the essay upon " Early English Equity," already referred to, the distinguished writer makes the further suggestion that, al- though the formless parol undertakings ultimately failed of recog- nition in the King's Courts, the Church for a long time, with varying success, claimed a general jurisdiction in cases of Icesio fidei ; and that after the Church was finally cut down to marriages and wills, the clerical Chancellors asserted for a time in Chancery the power of enforcing parol agreements, for which the ordinary King's courts afforded no remedy. It is believed that undue im- portance has been attached to the proceedings in the spiritual court for Icesio fidei. It is doubtless true that this court was eager to enlarge its jurisdiction, and to deal with cases of breach of faith not properly within its cognizance. We may also concede that the court was sometimes successful in keeping control of such cases when the defendant did not dispute the jurisdiction. But the authorities would seem to make it clear that from the time of the Constitutions of Clarendon, a prohibition would issue as a mat- ter of course from the King's Court upon the application of one who was drawn into the spiritual court upon breach of faith in a purely temporal matter.^ 1 Y. B. II & 12 Ed. 111.587; Y. B. 18 Ed. III. 13-7; Y. B. 44 Ed. 111.21,23; Y. B. 9 Hen. V. 14-23. The only statement in the Year Books to the contrary is the dictum of Candish, J., in 48 Ed. III. 6-11 : "And also this action of covenant of necessity is maintainable because for so slight a thing one cannot always have his clerk to make a specialty." The case in Y. B. 7 Ed. II. 242 can hardly be said to throw any light upon the question under discussion. 2 By the custom of London and Bristol, Debt was allowed upon a parol grant with- out quid pro quo. Y. B. 43 Ed. III. ii-i ; Y. B. 14 Hen. IV. 26-13; Y. B. 22 Ed. IV. 2-6; F. M. V. R. C, I M. & G. 6 n. (a.) ; Y. B. 38 Hen. VI. 29-12 ; Y. B. i Hen. VII. 22-12; Williams v. Gibbs, 5. A. & E. 208; Bruce v. Waite, i M. & G. i, and cases cited in Pollock, Cont. (6 ed.), 138 n. (p.). See also the cases of parol undertakings in the Bishop of Ely's Court, 4 Seld. Socy. 114-118. 8 Constitutions of Clarendon, c. 15, Stubbs, Sel. Chart. 134; Glanvil, Book X. c. 12; Abb. PI. 31, col. I, rot. 21 (1200); 2 Br. N. B. No. 50 (1219); J'itz. Abr. Prohib. 15 (1220) ; 2 Br. N. B. No. 1893 (1227) ; Stat. Circumspecte Agatis, 13 Ed. I. ; Y. B. 22 Lib. Ass. 70; Y. B. 2 Hen. IV. 10-45 J Y. B. 11 Hen. IV. 88-40 ; Y. B. 38 Hen. VI. 29^
