PAROL CONTRACTS PRIOR TO ASSUMPSIT. ' 263 the same in effect." This reasoning of Moyle, J., met with gen- eral favor, and it became a settled rule that whatever would consti- tute a quid pro quo, if rendered to the defendant himself, would be none the less a quid pro quo, though furnished to a third person, provided that it was furnished at the defendant's request, and that the third person incurred no liability therefor to the plaintiff. Ac- cordingly, a father was liable for physic provided for his daughter ;^ a mother for board furnished to her son ; ^ a woman was charged in Debt by a tailor for embroidering a gown for her daughter's maid ; ^ a defendant was liable for instruction given at his request to the children of a stranger, or for marrying a poor virgin.* The com- mon count for money paid by the plaintiff to another at the defend- ant's request is another familiar illustration of the rule. But it is an indispensable condition of the defendant's liability in Debt in cases where another person received the actual benefit, that this other person should not himself be Hable to the plaintiff for the benefit received. For in that event the third person would be the debtor, and one quid pro quo cannot give rise to two distinct debts.^ Accordingly where the plaintiff declared in Debt against A for money lent to B at A's request, his declaration was adjudged bad ; for a loan to B necessarily implied that B was the debtor. If B was, in truth, the debtor, the plaintiff should have declared in Special Assumpsit against A on the collateral promise. If B was not the debtor, the count against A should have been for money paid to B at A's request.^ By the same reasoning it would be im- proper to count against A for goods sold to B at A's request. If B was really the buyer, A should charge him in debt, and A in Special Assumpsit on the collateral promise. If B was not the buyer, the count against A should be for goods delivered to B at A's request The same distinction holds good as to services ren- 1 Stonehouse v. Bodvil, T. Ray. 67, i Keb. 439, s. c. 2 Bret V. J. S., Cro. El. 756. 8 Shandois v. Stinson, Cro. El. 880.
- Harris v. Finch, Al. 6.
^ '* There cannot be a double debt upon a single loan." Per Curiam, in Marriott v. Lister, 2 Wils. 141, 142. 8 " If it had been an Indebitatus Asstimpsitlox so much money paid by the plaintiff at the request of the defendant unto his son, it might have been good, for then it would be the father's debt and not his son's ; but when the money is lent to the son, 't is his proper debt, and not the father's." Per Holt, C. J., in Butcher v. Andrews, Carth. 446 (Salk. 23 ; Comb. 473, s. c). See also Marriott v. Lister, 2 Wils. 141. ^ Y. B. 27 Hen. VHL 25-3, per Fitz James, C. J. ; Hinson v. Burridge, Moore, 701 ; Cogan V. Green, i Roll. Ab. 594; Anon., i Vent. 293 ; Stonehouse v. Bodvil, i Keb. 439;
