bona fide assignment without preferences is of itself an act of bankruptcy.[1]
The early cases contra to this view seem to have been based largely on the opinion of Swayne, J., in Langley v. Perry,[2] and can no longer be considered law. On the other hand, the question has never been squarely decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, and in Mayer v. Hellman,[3] Field, J., remarked obiter that the position of counsel had much to commend it, viz., that such an assignment was only a voluntary execution of what the bankruptcy court can compel, and that, as it was not a proceeding in itself fraudulent as to creditors, and gave no preferences, it conflicted with no positive inhibition of the statute, citing the favorable opinion of Nelson, J., in Sedgwick v. Place[4] and of Swayne, J., in Langley v. Perry. In several cases assignments under State statutes regulating assignments have been held bad, because the State statutes were inconsistent with the bankrupt Acts,[5] and contra to the view sometimes expressed, that the assignments were held void because of what the statutes authorized, and not because the States attempted to regulate what Congress had said the general government alone should regulate;[6] these cases should be regarded as ambiguous on this point.[7]
37
- ↑ For a case in the District of Massachusetts, see Re Union Pacific R. R. Co., 10 N. B. R. 178, Lowell, J. For the best general discussion of cases, see Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 14 N. B. R. 311, 315 (Cir. Ct., N. Dist. Ohio) ; Barnes v. Rettew, 8 Phila. 133 (1871, Cir. Ct., E. Dist. Pa.). See also, to the same effect, Burrill on Assignments, 6th ed., §§ 29 ff. (1893) 5 Bump on Bankruptcy, 10th ed., 421 (1877); Bhimenstiel on Bankruptcy, 96 (1878) ; i Deacon on Bankruptcy, 3d ed., 68; i Christian on Bankruptcy, 2d ed., 135. There were no decisions on this point under the first bankruptcy Act of 1800. Under the second Act of 1841, see McLean v. Johnson, 3 McLean, 202 ; McLean v. Meline, 3 id. 199. The following are some of the earlier cases and dicta contra to the above. Langley V. Perry, 2 N. B. R. 596 (Cir. Ct. Ohio) ; Farrin v. Crawford, 2 N. B. R. 602 (Cir. Ct. Ohio) ; Sedgwick v. Place, i N. B. R. 673 (S. Dist. N. Y.) ; Re Kintzing, 3 N. B. R. 217 (E. Dist. Mo.) ; Re Marter, 12 N. B. R. 185, 187 (E. Dist. Mich.) ; Smith v. Teutonia Ins. Co., 4 C. L. N. 130. See also Re Arledge, i N. B. R. 644 (S. Dist. Ga.) ; Re Hawkins, 2 N. B. R. 378 (Sup. Ct. Conn.) ; Re Wells, i N. B. R. 171 (N. Dist. N. Y.) ; Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U. S. 496, 500; Brown v. Minturn, 2 Gall. 557, 559; Reed v. Mclntyre, 98 U. S. 507 ; Bishop on Insolvent Debtors, 2d ed., § 107. For a detailed criticism of these cases, see Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 14 N. B. R. 311.
- ↑ 2 N. B. R. 576 (C. Ct. Ohio).
- ↑ 91 U. S. 496; s. c. 13 N. B. R. 440.
- ↑ 1 N. B. R. 673.
- ↑ See Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379, 385 (1882) ; Reed v. Mclntyre, 98 U. S. 509-513.
- ↑ Globe Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Ins. Co., supra.
- ↑ See Griswold v. Pratt, 9 Met. 16 (1845) ; Day v. Bardwell,97 Mass. 246, 250 (1867); Lothrop v. Highland Foundry Co., 128 Mass. 122 (1880).