288 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. fact that witness had previously testified that he was in no way connected with the matter. On this point the court say : " The witness, by answering the general ques- tions as to his connection with the affair, whether his answers were true or false, did not wave his right to remain silent when it was sought to draw from him some facts or circumstances which, in his judgment, might form another link in the chain of facts, and capable of being used under any circumstances to his detriment or peril. . . . The witness, who knows what the court does not know, and what he cannot disclose without accusing himself, must in such cases judge for himself as to the effect of his answer." On the point as to whether the criminating quality of the question is to be left entirely to the determination of witness, see lo Oh. 336, i Speers (S. C. 128, which hold that it is, and 2 Greene (la.), 532, 9 Wis. 140, 7 Tex. 215, contra. Evidence — Reading Reports to Jury. — A telegraph company was sued for damages sustained on account of the non-delivery of a telegram, and in the course of the trial counsel for plaintiff read to the jury reports of Supreme Court cases to show that verdicts of a certain amount had been allowed by that court. Held, that this was wrongly permitted. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Teague, 27 S. W. Rep. 958 (Tex.). The Texas court has sustained a change of heart within a few years, as regards this matter. In Railway Co. v. LamotAe, 76 Texas, 222, this was said to be within the dis- cretion of the trial court, and that the decision of the lower court would not be reversed unless a clear abuse of this discretion was shown, together with injury. In Railway Co. v. Wesch, 21 S. W. Rep. 62, the court said, again, that this was discretionary, but that they did not like it. In Railway Co. v. IVesck, 22 S. W. Rep. 957, they said it was error to allow this ; and such seems to be the present law of Texas, as of most States. Such a holding is eminently desirable, as the reading reports of large verdicts must tend to increase verdicts which already are often too large, and the reports have absolutely no tendency to prove the amount plaintiff is entitled to recover in the case on trial. If it be argued that this is a matter of law, the answer is that in civil cases the counsel is not allowed to address the jury on matters of law, and, only in a few juris- dictions, in criminal cases. Persons — Divorce — Cruelty. — A wife, being infatuated with another man, so conducted herself toward him that she caused her husband to become unpleasantly notorious in the papers. She also neglected her household duties. The husband suf- fered mentally on account of this, and his health was impaired. Held, that this did not constitute cruelty so as to entitle the husband to a divorce ; the actions of the wife not being wilful. Ennis v. Entiis, 60 N. W. Rep. 228 (la.). While the decision of this case on all the facts is probably sound, still it is an inter- esting question how far the courts would allow a misguided husband or wife to continue this kind of behavior, though not malicious nor intended to injure the other party. It seems as if a point would soon be reached where the principle that a person must be presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts, would be ap- plied, especially as divorce for cruelty is decreed as a protection to the injured party, and not as a punishment to the guilty one. Persons — Married Woman as her Husband's Partner — Liability for Firm Debts. — A married woman empowered to trade as a single woman, having formed a partnership with her husband, was sued for the debts of the firm. The de- fence set up was that the statute did not enlarge her powers toward her husband. Held, that the defendant, having held herself out to the world as interested in the business jointly with her husband, and as being therefore liable for the firm debts, cannot be allowed to set up that the contract between herself and her husband was invalid, in order to escape liability. Louisville 6^ N. R. Co. v. Alexander, 27 S. W. Rep. 981 (Ky.). This case greatly extends the doctrine of estoppel of married women. Practice — Subpcena duces tecum — Messages in the Hands of a Tele- graph Company. — Under the general authority of the United States courts, a sub- pcena duces tecum will lie at the petition of the district attorney against the superinten- dent of a telegraph company, compelling him to produce telegraphic messages in aid of the investigation by a grand jury of supposed criminal acts of the senders and re- ceivers. If the company is in no way personally interested, such messages are not privileged communications, and must be disclosed on the order of the court. In re Storror, (y-X) Fed. Rep. 564 (Cal.). This case is one of the manv which trace their origin more or less directly to the rail- way strikes of last summer. The grand jury of the Federal Court for Northern Cali- fornia in their search for the party responsible for the delay of the United States mail, obtained the subpoena in question, and the opinion is filed in denying a motion to quash the same. The judgment in the principal case is supported by decisions in Maine,
