RECENT CASES. 3^5 being that though the plaintiff was a mere licensee, the defendant was still liable for making the premises more dangerous without notice. X(jKis — Deceit — Means of Knowledge. — Action for deceit in the sale of land. The court heU, that it was for the jury to say whether plaintiff was or was not foolish in relying on defendant's statements. Brady v. Finn, 38 N. E. Rep. 506 (Mass.). The court assume that plaintiff and defendant had an equal chance of finding out the truth of the representations, which assumption seems incorrect. The land was in a re- mote and in;iccessible town, and of course the owner knew much more about ti.e land than the stranger. But assuming that plaintiff could have informed himself in regard to the land as easily as defendant, was it necessary to leave the question of plaintiff's negligence to the jury, or to discuss it .> Kegligence cannot exist unless there is a duty on the part of plaintiff to act or forbear. Is there any more duty to use due care be- fore acting on a false representation made with knowledge of its falsity and intending to deceive, than to use such care in avoiding or jumping out of the way of a man who intentionally hits or shoots at you? It is submitted that there is not. "No man can complain that another has relied too implicitly on the truth of what he himself stated." Kerr on Fraud, p. 81. " It is no excuse for, nor does it lie in the mouth of the defe .ri- ant to aver, that plaintiff might have discovered the wrong and prevented its accom- plishment, had he exercised watchfulness, because this is equivalent to saying, ' You trusted me, therefore I had the right to betray you.' " Pomeroy v. Benton, 57 Mo 531. To the same effect, 57 Mo. 478 ; 2 Bish. New Cr. Law, §§433-436 and 464. Bigelow on Fraud, pp. 522, 523, and 528. 121 Ind. 191, and 8 Harvakd Law Review, 63. Torts — Injury to Wife — Damages. — Action for loss of service. While at- tempting to enter a car of the defendants, the plaintiff's wife was injured through the negligence of the guard in closing the gate upon her. She had been pregnant for a few weeks, and, as a result of the injury, miscarried. Held (reversing the decision of the court below), that plaintiff cannot recover damages for the loss of prospective offspring. Butler V. Manhattan, &^c. R. R., 38 N. E. Rep. 454 (N. Y.). As is pointed out at common law, the death of a person, caused by the negligence of another, gave no right of action for damages to the kindred of the deceased. This was changed in England by the statute known as Lord Campbell's Act, the provisiors of which were adopted in New York (Laws, 1847, c. 450, and Laws, 1849, c 256) and in other States. Under it, actions may be maintained for the death of infant children for the benefit of their parents, the basis of damage being the sujjposed pecuniary value to the parents of the infant's life. Birkett v. Ice Co., 100 N. Y. 504, and cases cited. To ascertain such value is, in great degree, a matter of speculation and conjecture, yet the law permits juries to determine it. They have some slight aids, however, the facts of the age, sex, and health of the child, its grade of intelligence, &c. These are lacking in the case of a child unborn, and the court refuse to extend the law to include cases of this nature. No authorities aie cited for the position taken, but the decision seems sound. Torts — Insanity — Action for Negligence. — While temporarily insane, the master of a vessel, whose rudder was broken so that she could not be steered, allowed the vessel to drift ashore, refusing the proffered assistance of two tugs, and making no attempt to save her, whereby she became a total wreck. In an action against the master for negligence in the management of the vessel, it was held that such insanity not having been caused by defendant's efforts to save the vessel, was no defence. (Peckham, Gray, and O'Brien, J J., dissenting.) Williams v. Hays, 38 N. E. Rep. 449 (N. Y.). It is difficult to see upon what grounds the dis.senting judges went, — their opin? ions are not reported, — for it is almost too well settled to admit of argument that an insane person is liable for his torts, whether of misfeasance or of non-feasance. See the exhaustive collection of cases and text-writers cited in the opinion. In Wharton on Negligence, § 88, it is stated that lunatics cannot be held responsible for any greater degree of care than they possess, but as is pointed out in Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, the authorities cited there are either cases of contributory negligence or dicta from the Roman law.
