368 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. are, but as they will be at the end of the stipulated period, with all the additions to them subsequently acquired from the soil. The case of Green v, Armstrong,^ deserves to be considered the leading one on this point. The vendee there had the right to cut and carry away the trees " at any time within twenty years ; " and after he had cut a part, the vendor forbid him to cut the rest, — or, in other words, revoked his license, — and the vendee brought an action on the contract for damages, but it was held he could not recover as the contract was only oral. This decision has been often approved in New York.^ The subject was elaborately examined with the same conclusion in Kingsley v. Holbrook,^ where the time allowed was three years; and this was approved in Howe v. Bachelder.^ 2. The second class of cases is where the trees are to stand for an indefinite time, and to be severed solely at the pleasure of the buyer. Here also some decisions and more dicta declare that the same rule applies and that the Statute requires a writing. Buck V. Pickwell ^ is one of the most important of this class. There the purchaser of the trees had an absolutely indefinite time in which to take them off. The vendor sold and conveyed the land before the trees had been cut, and after twenty years a subse- quent grantee of the land, whose deed contained no reservation of the trees, cut and carried away the remainder, and the first pur- chaser sued him in trespass for cutting down his growing trees. Obviously, the case on those facts could be decided in only one way; for even if the oral sale had been held originally valid, the subsequent conveyance of the land before the trees had been cut would have revoked the license to enter and cut them, and the plaintiff would have been liable to the defendant in trespass for such act; of course, then, he could hardly expect the defendant would be liable to him for the very same cutting. The point of revocation, however, does not seem to have been made in the case, and although the decision itself is correct, even on the ground upon which it was put, yet the same court has declined to extend it " beyond the very point in judgment." ^ 1 I Denio, 550 (1845). 2 See McGregor v. Brown, 6 Seld. 114; Vorsebeck v. Roe, 50 Barb. 302; Goodyear V. Voseburgh, 57 Barb. 243. 8 45 N.H. 313 (1864).
- 49 N. H. 204 (1870). See also Putney v. Day, 6 N. H. 430 (1833), and Olmstead
V. Niles, 7 N. H. 522 (1835), where the time allowed was twenty-five years. ° 27 Vt. 157 (1854). 6 See Sterling v. Baldwin, 42 Vt. 309.
