A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF TORT-RELATIONS. 383 tinctly a " prophylactic " one, because the registered owner need show no specific harm, i. e. his right is against the mere making for use, whether or not he can show the actual loss of a customer.^ 9. Taking next the Domestic relations, and inquiring what relations and what kinds of benefits from them are recognized as the subject of a claim, we find in general that the filial, parental, and marital relations are thus recognized, with of course certain historical exceptions ; that the loss of material benefits (support, services) is in the main the legal harm ; and that the loss of affec- tion, etc., is in part also recognized. The nature of the action for seduction is here involved. Modern statutes supplying defects of the common-law (" death by wrongful act ") are to be considered, — in particular the difference between (i) statutes vesting recovery in those who have lost support, (2) statutes vesting recovery in relatives merely as such, and (3) statutes merely causing the deceased person's claim for corporal injury to survive. 10. Under Contractual relations no question arises as to their recognition ; this is conceded. The question, What modes of interference are excusable and what are not? is one of Excuse. 11. In addition to the above sorts of harm to societary relations (7, 8, 9, 10; generalized in the paragraph preceding 7), the right is to have the benefit of certain relations preserved, not destroyed or diverted. But there is also a right of very limited application, which may be phrased as a right to have a burdensome relation not enlarged, not made more burdensome; the claim is based, not on the social benefits that would otherwise have come to us, but on the 'social burden that would otherwise not have come to us. The ordinary instance is that of medical expenses incurred in car- ing for an injured child or wife. Other instances, not yet judicially recognized, are found in Anthony v. Slade,^ where a pauper whom the plaintiff was bound to support was beaten by the defendant, so that the plaintiff incurred additional expense in caring for him; and in Midland Ins. Co. v. Smith,^ where an insurance company by the defendant's incendiary act was obliged to payout insurance money which it might never have had to pay. It seems proper to distinguish this group from the preceding ones, because the con- siderations of Responsibility and Excuse may here be different. 1 Robinson on Patents, §§ 898, 903 ; Drone on Copyright, pp. 521, 633. 2 II Mete. 290. 8 6 Q. B. D. 565; also Simpson v. Burrell, 3 App. Cas. 289; Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 758. See also Dale v. Grant, 34 N. J. L. 142. SI
