RECENT CASES. 511 is actionable, and an act is malicious in point of law if done intentionally and with- out legal excuse. Injunction granted. Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 30 Atl. Kep. 88t(H. J.) This case adds one more well considered decision to the rapidly increasing number of cases supporting the proposition laid down by Bowen, L. J., in Mogul Steamship Co. V. McGregor, L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 598, that an act which causes damage to another, though lawful in itself, may become actionable if done without just cause or excuse. It is to be regretted that so able an opinion as the present, and one that contains such an exhaustive review of the cases in support of the decision, does not deal with any of the mass of authorities the other way. Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225 ; Payne v. Ry. Co., 13 Lea, 507; Boyson v. 7'horn, 33 Pac. Rep. 492; Chatjield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261 ; Phelps v. A'o^vlen, 72 N. Y. 39. Such cases as these are all within Lord Bowen's broad rule. There are, however, the possible distinctions, that in the principal case the boycott involved threats or intimidation, thus bringing the case within the principle of Tarleton v. ATGuwley, Peake, 205, and that an act, though not actionable when done by an individual, may become so when done by a combination conspiring together. Curran v. Galen, 22 N. Y. Supp. 826. But see Delz V. Wiiifree, 80 Tex. 400. A glance at the cases shows that the question is very far from being solved, but the present case reaches the result that is to be desired. 7 Harvard Law Review, 180; 21 American Law Review, 509, 764. Torts — Trespass — Inevitable Accident. — Where the defendant's cab-driver, without negligence, tries to turn down a side street, on account of a break in the harness at the brink of a steep descent, and the horse runs into the plaintiff's shop window, it is held that trespass will not lie, since the act was neither negligent nor voluntary on the part of the driver. Peacock v. Nicholson, n The Times Law Rep. 225 (Q. B. 1).). This affirms the decision in Stanley v. Powell, [1891] i Q. B. 86, and seems per- fectly sound. The court distinguish the case of negligence and that of intentionally inflicting one injury for the purpose of avoiding another, and, since no blame at all is attached to the accident, allow no recovery for it. Trade Mark — Fancy Word " Mazawattee." — Application to strike off the register certain trade marks consisting of or combining the word " Mazawattee" on the ground that it was a descriptive word, inasmuch as the last part, " wattee," meant in Cingalese an estate, and the first part, " Maza," meant relish in the Hindu lan- guage, and that taken together the word conveyed the impression that the tea sold under this name came from Ceylon. I/eld, In England this word was meaningless. To Hindus it was also meaningless, because they could not understand the last part, nor was it intelligible to the Cingalese, for they could not understand the first part. The word therefore had no meaning in any known language, and could not be called descriptive. In Re Densham dr> Sons' Trade Mark, 11 The Times Law Rep. 184 (Chan. Div., Romer, J.). The court intimates that the decisions have gone too far in holding certain words to be descriptive, and especially throws doubt on the soundness of the decision in In Re Jackson's Trade Mark, 6 Rep. Pat. Cas. 8(1, which held that the word " Kokoko " was not allowed to be registered because the word in the language of the Chippeway In- dians meant an owl, and, as an owl is a common mark on certain Manchester goods, it was held that the word was not a good " fancy " word, inasmuch as it was not known how long it might not be before there was a trade with these Indians in Manchester goods, in which case these goods might be confused with those marked " Kokoko." Romer, J., in the principal case, says that under the peculiar circumstances he would have left the Chippeway Indians to take care of themselves. See on this point Browne on Trade Marks, 2d ed., §§ t^'t^, 547.
