58 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, because the jury had been instructed in accordance with the latter. The same view and the same result occurred in What Cheer Coal Co. v. John- son, 56 Fed. R. 810 (C. C. A. Eighth Circuit, June 26, 1893), and yet in neither case was the Ross case treated as overruled. In U. P. Ry. Co. V. Callaghan, 56 Fed. R. 988 (C. C. A. Eighth Circuit, July 10, 1893), the Ross case was followed as to a conductor and an employee merely riding on the train. In Mimieapolis v. Lundin, 58 Fed. R. 525 (C. C. A. Eighth Circuit, Oct. 30, 1893), the Ross case was not treated as over- ruled, and the doctrine of the Federal courts was said by Sanborn, J., to be, that if an employee is "entrusted with the entire management and supervision of all the business of the corporation, or with the entire management and supervision of a distinct and separate department of its business, ... he may be termed a general vice-principal, because, in all his acts relative to the business of the corporation, he stands in the place of the mast^, and the latter is liable." So in Bloyd v. St. L. 6- S. F. Ry. Co., 22 S. W. 1089 (Ark., July i, 1893), the Ross case and the Baugh case were held to be distinguishable. xi A. T. ^ S. F. Ry. v. Martin, 34 Pac. R. 536 (N. Mex., Aiig. 16, 1893), a very elaborately considered case, the Ross case is treated as overruled, and the Baugh case said to contain " the view . . . held by the majority of courts, which base the fellow-servant relation upon the character of the negligent act, rather than upon the grade or department of work." In ///. C. Ry. Co. v. Spence, 23 S. W. 211 (Tenn., Sept. 21, 1893), the Ross case is also said to be overruled ; and, finally, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Han?m v. Granger (March, 1894), says, in deciding the case of one in- jured by the negligence of the engineer of a steam-roller, who, although in charge of the work, was held to be acting at the moment as a fellow- servant (followed by the same court in De Marcho v. Builders^ Iron Foundry, where a foreman threw a box upon a pile of iron posts), says that the Ross case is " explained. Indeed, we may almost say that it is explained away" by the Baugh case. In 'iew of the difference of opinion, no one will care at present to say what the final effect of the authorities will be. In the Ross case the Supreme Court introduced the doctrine into good society. How will it get along now that its sponsor seems to have disowned it? And will its sponsor take it up again ? RECENT CASES. Agency — Independent Contractor — Liability of Owner of Premises. — Defendant company made a contract with A, whereby he was to " fall and burn" the bush on defendant's land. A negligently lit a fire on the land while there was a strong wind blowing in the direction of plaintiffs land. The fire spread to plaintiff's land, doing great damage. Held, that defendant was liable for the negligence of its contractor, on the ground that the act to be performed was one necessarily attended with great danger, and a proprietor who authorizes it is bound to see that all reason- able precaution is observed. Black v. Christ Church Finance Co. [1894], App. Cas. 48 (Eng.). This decision rests upon a well-recognized exception to the " Independent Con- tractor" doctrine, viz., that a principal is liable for the negligence of his contractor in performing a duty which the law absolutely imposes on the principal, or which is in Its nature dangerous and liable to result in injuries to third parties. Mechtm on Agency, § 747. It seems quite clear that this case falls within the exception.
