RECENT CASES. 153 resulting from delay occasioned by a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, although such breach was due to a hidden defect in the propeller shaft of the vessel, not attribu- table to the carrier's negligence. The Caledonia, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 537. This decision falls in line with the weight of authority and better opinion both in England and the United States, holding a shipowner responsible as an insurer as to latent defects in his vessel, unknown to him and not discoverable upon examination. 3 Kent's Comm. 205. The strong dissenting opinion of three members of the court is based upon an alleged distinction between an injury caused directly by breach of the warranty of seaworthiness and loss resulting from delay caused by such breach. There is no doubt that, generally speaking, a carrier is not an insurer as to the time of delivery or losses flowing out of accidental delay. But this is an action for conse- quential damages due to a breach of warranty. The fault of the carrier is the breaking the warranty; and it cannot be said that the delay caused thereby is excusable within the rule relied upon by the dissenting justices. Carriers — When a Carrier becomes Warehouseman. — A railway com- pany, having carried plaintiff's goods to their destination, stored them in its ware- house, in which they were destroyed by fire, through no fault of the defendant. Held, that a railroad's liability as a common carrier continues until notice of the arrival of the goods is given to the consignee, and he has had a reasonable time thereafter to remove them. Lake Erie ^ W. R. Co. v. Hatch, 39 N. E. Rep. 1042 (Ohio). The case is one of first impression, committing Ohio to the view advanced by the New York Courts in opposition to the great weight of authority, making the liability of the carrier as such terminate with the arrival of the goods at their destination. Formerly, an actual delivery of the goods was required of the carrier; and now that modern modes of transportation have made personal delivery impracticable, the juris- dictions which have settled upon a reasonable time for removal, or a reasonable time with notice, in substitution, claim that they are thus following the old common-law rule. In reality they have extended it beyond its utmost limits by making the carrier liable as a carrier when he has ceased to be one, and when the reasons for his extraordinary liability have ceased to exist. Choses in Action — Assignment — Priority of Notice to Debtor. — Held, where two assignments of a chose in action are made to different persons, the assignee who first gives notice of his claim to the debtor has the prior right, though the assign- ment to him is later in date than that to the other assignee. Methven et al. v. Staten Island Light, Heat ^^ Power Co., 66 Fed. Rep. 113. This case follows the settled rule in the U. S. Supreme Court, — Spaitiv. Hamil- ton s Adni'r, I Wall. 604, — in England and in some of our States. The contrary rule, that the prior assignee prevails, is established in New York, Massachusetts, and many of our States. It is submitted that the New York and Massachusetts rule is correct on principle, and that the general principle that "he who is first in time is best in right" should determine this class of cases, except (i) where the second assignee has been misled by prior assignee's failure to notify the debtor, and (2) where the second assignee has obtained payment, or, what is practically the same thing, reduced the claim to a judgment or effected a novation, in which cases the second assignee has obtained a legal right, and should not be compelled to give it up. The case of Spain v. Hamilton s Adm'r, i Wall. 604, which established the rule in the U. S. Supreme Court, seems to have been decided on a misapprehension of an earlier decision by the same court, — that oi/udson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 612. There the second assignee had reduced the claim to possession, and the decision is expressly put on that ground. And yet Spain v. Hamilton's Adm'r is decided as being clearly within the principles recognized Judson v. Corcoran. Constitutional Law — Municipal Boundaries — Legislative and Judicial PowKR.— - An act of the legislature authorized the annexation of a strip of land lying in an adjoining county, to a city. The strip was entirely separated from the city by four distinct municipal corporations, running from the county line to the original boundary of the city. Plaintiff, a landowner in the strip, brought a bill to enjoin the collection of municipal taxes. Held, that the legislature had no power to extend the limits of a specially chartered city by adding to it lands entirely separated by intervening territory. Injunction granted. City of Denver v. Conlehan, 39 Pac. Rep. 425 (Col.). The court go into the definitions of "city" and " town," and emphasize the idea of unity, of collectiveness, which they think is conveyed by the use of such terms. They conclude by saying that it was never contemplated by the law that the territorial limits of a city might include distinct parcels of land, separated from the city proper by inter- vening territory. Stnith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, seems to support the view taken by the court. But actual instances inconsistent with the above may be noted. Portions of sev-
