156 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. 163. Barry v. Equitable Life, 59 N. Y. 587, 593 [semHe). Contra, are Elliot's Appeal, 50 Pa. 75 (semble) ; Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195. For an exhaustive criticism of the latter case by Prof. VVilliston, see 25 American Law Review, 185. EviDExNCE — Deed — Collateral Unsealed Instrument. — Plaintiff's intestate deeded land to defendant absolutely. At time of delivery of the deed both signed a sepa- rate unsealed instrument, stipulating that the deed was conditioned on the grantee's sup- porting the grantor for life. Both instruments were made for the purpose of effectuating a previous oral contract. Both were recorded. In an action of ejectment it was held, that the two instruments should ba read together in determining the grantee's title under the deed. Norton's Adm'r v. Perkins, 31 Atl. Rep. 148 ( Vt.). It is well settled that parol evidence is admissible to show that a deed absolute on its face was really intended as a mortgage. The cases seem to limit this exception to trans- fers intended as security, and the principal case seems to go farther than any of the authorities. Insurance — Recovery upon an Accident Policy — Legal Cause. — Defend- ant company insured the plaintiff's intestate against accidents, but with a proviso that the policy should not cover suicide, intentional injuries or death resulting from disease. The insured accidentally shot himself. The wound resulted in tetanus, and on the eighteenth day he was found dead, with his throat cut and a scalpel in his hand. It was also evi- dent that he had died in a tetanic spasm. Held, a charge was unexceptionable to the effect that, if the wound was an accident and produced tetanus, and if the insured was impelled to kill himself from the intense agony caused by the tetanus, then the jury might find that the pistol shot was the proximate cause of the death. Although the deceased cut his own throat and died from the direct effects of the cut. Travellers' Ins, Co. v. Melick, 65 Fed. Rep. 178. This case is interesting as involving the doctrine laid down in Schaeffer v. Ry. 115 U. S. 249. It was suggested in 8 Harvard Law Review^, 176, that the question of whether an accident could be the proximate cause of insanity and subsequent suicide, should at least be submitted to a jury. This was practically the question submitted here, and a verdict for the plaintiff is sustained. The action in the above case sounded in tort, and the doctrine of proximate cause was invoked to measure the liability; while in the principal case the policy fixed the extent of the liability and the only question was whether death did result from the wound. The difference between the cases in principle, how- ever, is not great, and this decision would seem correct in allowing a jury to pass upon the evidence. Persons — Criminal Conversation. — Held^ that a married woman cannot main- tain an action for damages against one of her own sex, where the right of recovery is based solely on alleged adulterous acts between plaintiff's husband and the defendant. Kroessin v. Keller, 62 N. W. Rep. 438 (Min.). Justice Collins rests his decision upon the distinction between an action simply in the nature of criminal conversation, and one founded on the substantive right of a wife to the society and protection of her husband. It is upon this ground, if at all, that the case is to be supported. Haynes v. Nolin, 129 Ind. 581 ; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584. The result arrived at by the court here embodies the spirit of the English rule that a husband alone can obtain divorce by merely proving the fact of criminal conversation, and expresses the general impression of the day that the male is the only sex which can be greatly damaged by violation of the marriage vow. There is little doubt that, at pres- ent, this decision would be widely approved in United States courts, especially when- ever the effect of modern statutes upon the legal status of women has not been felt in its full force. But quezre whether the social, as well as the lee:al, revolution in the relations of the sexes should not bear in a practical manner upon an action of this kind. There is at least one decision in this country which would seem to point in that direction. Seaver v. Adams, 19 Atl. Rep. 776, Property — Continuous and Apparent Easements. — Plaintiff and defendant purchased a building which consisted of two dwellings exactly alike. Each simultaneously took a separate deed of his dwelling and his respective half of the land on which the building was located. Each dwelling was supplied with water from a well somewhere upon the land. The only part of the water-supplying apparatus visible was a pump in each kitchen. The well was afterwards found to be on defendant's land and he shut off plaintiff's water supply. Held, the right to water from this well passed to plaintiff with his deed, it being a continuous and apparent easement. Larseny. Peterson, 30 Atl. Rep. 1094 (N. J.). This decision follows Pyer v. Carter, i H & N. 916, and is contra to the dictum in Suffield V. Brown, 4 De G. J. & S. 185, which has been followed in many jurisdictions.
