l6o HARVARD LAW REVIEW. senting to the brother that he was purchasing for plaintiff. Defendant refused to convey to plaintiff, although the latter tendered full compensation. Held, defendant is con- structive trustee for plaintiff. Naii^ht y. Pearson, 39 Pac. Rep. 479 (Utah). A sound case. By means of his fraudulent representations, defendant caused plain- tiff damage, — a tort, for which equity will allow specific reparation. It would seem that the stress put by the court upon the confidential relations between lawyer and client was unnecessary. The fact that the conveyance was procured by fraud makes it need- less to consider what effect the Statute of Frauds would have upon such an oral under- standing between principal and agent. Onson v. Cown, 22 Wis. 329. Cipperly v. Cip- perly, 4 Thomp. & C. 342 accord. See also Lombard v. Cowham, 34 Wis. 486. Trusts— Principal and Agent — Following Trust Funds. — Defendant's intestate had been the New York agent of plaintiffs, buying and selling goods for them. Interest was charged on the balances against whichever party happened to be the debtor, and settlements were made semi-annually. At the last settlement before deceased's death plaintiffs had been indebted to him, but had since remitted drafts discharging the debt and leaving a balance due them ; and the avails of the drafts remitted after the indebted- ness had been discharged could be distinctly traced into deceased's bank account. Held, plaintiffs can prevail against deceased's general creditors on the principle that " where the principal can trace his property into the hands of his agent, he may follow and reclaim it." " Because deceased was plaintiffs' agent, the property received by him became im- pressed with a trust character." J^oca v. Byrne et at., 39 N. E. Rep. 812 (N. Y.). The court seems to have entirely disregarded the fact that "interest was paid on the balances." The payment of interest, it is submitted, shows conclusively that the de- ceased received the money as debtor, and not as trustee. " If a man pays interest for money, he must be entitled to the use of it." Ex parte, Bread, 13 Q. B. D. 740. Trusts— Statute of Frauds — Parol Agreement to hold in Trust. — Plaintiff conveyed land to the defendant, his sister, without consideration, and in reliance on her parol promise to hold in trust for him. Plaintiff brought action for reconvey- ance. Held, that the case fell within the Statute of Frauds, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to reconveyance. Hutchinson v. Hutchinso7i, 32 N. Y. Sup. 390. See Notes, Wills — Revocation — Second Codicil — Intention to Revoke First Codi- cil. — After testator had made his will and a first codicil, his wife died. He then made a second codicil, nowhere referring to the first, but only to the will. By this codicil he appointed the same executors which he had by the first codicil, gave legacies of the same sums to the same i^ersons, gave the same directions as to his place of burial and a monu- ment for himself, and devised an India shawl again to his sister-in-law, as he had done in the first codicil. But he made a gift of ;^400 to Mary Alridge, whereas by the first codi- cil he had bequeathed her ^200, He also omitted a revocation of a gift of jewelry and other articles to his wife, and the subsequent gift of ^^5,000 to his sister, Julia Stainforth, and substituted for it a direction to the trustees to set aside ;^5,ooo out of the residue for such sister. In all other respects the language of the second codicil was identical with the first. Held, testator intended to revoke the first codicil and substitute for it the second, and that probate should go of the will and second codicil only. Chichester ei al. V. Qnatrcfuges et al., 11 The Times Law Rep. 328. The case is interesting as showing how a probate judge looks entirely at the intention of the deceased to find out what documents he or she meant to operate as his or her will. The court says that extrinsic evidence may be freely made use of; but, as there is none, the instruments show on their face the intention of the testator merely to repeat the first codicil by the second, the strong points being, the fact that he referred only to the will in the second codicil, and (apart from the change in the amount of the legacy to the nurse effected after the second codicil had been engrossed) the codicil expressed only the legal effect of the first, having regard to the fact of the supervening death of the testator's wife, and the fact that the specific legacies of sums of money and articles were identical in both. There would seem here to be sufficient evidence to maintain the construction of the court as to the testator's intention. The Wills Act (i Vic. c. 26, § 20) says nothing in regard to what will or codicil, being duly executed, will revoke a former one, and consequently it has now become settled that no express revocation is necessary, but that a revocation by implication is sufficient. It was on this ground that the court proceeded in the principal case, following Jenner v. Ffinch^ 5 P. D. 106, and Demtsey v. Lawson, 2 P. D. 98.
