194 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, only to those cases in which fire companies have done part of the work of putting out the fire. , The next case of the use of fire-engines after Nimick v. Holmes, is Nelson v. Belmont,^ tried in 1856. It was taken for granted that the case was one of general average, though the fire compa- nies assisted ; the dispute was whether the defendant's specie was, under the peculiar circumstances, liable to contribute. The same right to contribution was not disputed by Admiralty lawyers of experience in Gregory v. Orrall. ^ In that case, the fire companies did part of the work and made no charge ; the rest was by the crew and by salvors. That salvage should be brought into contribution was taken for granted ; no one intimated that the action of the fire companies had any bearing on the question. The like rule was followed in The Roanoke.^ In that case, the District Judge notices that the master procured the action of the companies by sounding the alarm. He does this to avoid a dis- cussion of the Massachusetts case which finds that the compa- nies came without being summoned. It by no means appears that his own opinion turned on that point. On appeal this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals ; and the opinion takes no notice of the fact that the master caused the alarm to be sounded. A like decision was made in The Rapid Transit.* That the master or seamen invited the aid of the fire companies was proved or may be fairly inferred in the cases of Nelson v. Belmont, Gregory v. Orrall, and The Roanoke. In Gregory v. Orrall, the master and mate were both on shore, and the fire com- panies were summoned by some one ; I assume that it was by the crew. Such summons is neither proved nor to be inferred in Nimick v. Holmes, or The Rapid Transit ; and what is more im- portant, no argument or question was made or suggested on this point in any case except in The Roanoke, where, as I have explained, it was used to meet a citation of the Massachusetts case. I ought to add that neither in the Massachusetts case nor any other has the mere fact of who spoke first been thought to raise a distinction upon which to hang a great injustice. No court ever could hold that. The distinction taken in the Massachusetts case and in Ralli v. Troup is that the municipal companies took control of the operations. It is intimated in the former case that themas- ^ 3 Duer, 310 ; 21 N. Y. 36. 8 46 Fed. Rep. 297 ; 59 Fed. Rep. 161. a 8 Fed. Rep 287. * 52 Fed. Rep. 320.
