234 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. cient reason why another person could not, even though interested in the performance. To allow two actions by two disconnected persons, having opposite interests, upon the same promise, would indeed be anomalous.^ That a plaintiff cannot maintain an action when the whole con- sideration moves from a third person to the defendant, and the defendant's promise is made wholly to such third person, has been the law of England for over two centuries.^ A marked illustration of this principle occurred in the recent case of Tweddle v. Atkinson,^ in which two fathers, whose children had intermarried, promised each other to pay a certain sum to the son as a marriage portion. One of them failed to pay according to the agreement, and it was held that the son could not maintain an action for the amount, notwithstanding the relationship between the promisee and the son, and notwithstanding the contract itself stipulated that the son might do so.* In America also the same general principle has been often adopted. This subject was carefully examined in Exchange Bank V. Rice,^ where Mr. Justice Gray says, "The general rule of law is, that a person who is not a party to a simple contract, and from whom no consideration moves, cannot sue on the contract, and consequently that a promise made by one person to another, for the benefit of a third person who is a stranger to the consideration, will not support an action by the latter." In Edmundson v. Penny,^ Gibson, C. J. says, " The plaintiff must unite in his person both the promise and the consideration of it, in order to recover." A few illustrations of this rule may be given. In Treat v. Stanton,^ S. bequeathed ;^ioo to each of five nieces, and appointed T. her executor. He placed the amount of the lega- cies in the hands of the defendant, who agreed with him to pay the nieces when they became of age, according to the terms of the will. It was held that the executor, and not the nieces, was the proper person to enforce that contract. In Ross V. Milne,^ the defendant, in consideration of a transfer ^ See Corey z/. Powers, i8 Vt. 589 (1846); Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 156 (1869); Guthrie v. Kerr, 85 Pa. St. 303 (1877). "^ Bourne v. Mason, i Ventris, 6 (1669); Crow v, Rogers, I Str. 592 (1724); Price V. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433; i N. & M. 303 (1833). 8 I B. & S. 393 (1861).
- See also Byrne v. Byrne, 7 Ir. Jur. N. S. 221 (1S62).
5 107 Mass. 41 (1871). ♦ '^ 14 Conn. 445 (1841). « I Pa, St. 335 (1845). ® 12 Leigh, 204 (1841).
