488 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Persons — Obligation of Husband to Support Wife and Child Living Apart from Him. — Where, pending proceedings on a petition for divorce by a wife who with her minor daughter is living apart from her husband, temporary alimony is allowed, the court will presume such alimony was meant to include a physician's bills for services to the wife and child, but anyway the husband cannot be charged without showing a contract by him to be so charged. Hyde v. Luienrvig, 65 N. W. Rep. 536 (Mich.). As the petition for divorce ultimately was dismissed, thus showing she left her hus- band without cause, the decision seems unquestionable. Had she left with cause, it is doubtful if the physician could have recovered for necessarv attendance on the child, though for such attendance on the wife, generally speaking, he could. Reynolds v. Sweet- ser, 15 Gray, 78, holds that a wife leaving her husband with proper cause carries with her his credit, so as to make him responsible for the necessary expenses of both. This decision is due to the Massachusetts doctrine that a father is liable for necessaries furnished to his infant child without express contract on his part. At the common law no such liability accrued from the mere duty to support, which was regarded as a moral and not a legal duty. Shelton v. Spruoitt, 11 C. B. 452. The Massachusetts court thought it a legal duty. There are other decisions holding the duty a legal one. 79 la. 151, and cases cited. But whether we follow the strict common law doctrine or not, the decision in the principal case would seem correct. Property — Conveyance of an Expectant Estate. — A son, for valuable consideration, executed a deed purporting to pass all the interest in his father's estate which he then had, or might be entitled to on his father's death. Held, that such con- veyance of a bare possibility, not coupled with an interest, was void. McCalVs Administrator v. Ha?tipton et al., 32 S. W. Rep. 406 (Ky.). See Notes. Property — Covenant of Warranty — Liability of Remote Warrantor. — A. conveyed land to B. by warranty deed, reciting a consideration of $5,000. Really but $500 was paid. B. conveyed to C, and C. to L). D. was ejected by the possessor of a title paramount to A.'s. D. sued A., and claimed to be entitled to recover the full consideration recited in the deed. Held, while a warrantor may show by parol as against his immediate grantee that the consideration was less than that recited in the deed, he cannot show it as against a remote grantee purchasing without notice. Allison V. Pitkin, 33 S. W. Rep. 293 (Tex.). In jurisdictions which limit the damages on a covenant of warranty to the considera- tion paid, the rule stated in the principal case is well settled. Greenvault v. Davis, 4 Hill, 643, 649; Illinois S &= S. Co. v. Bonner, 91 111. 114. The warrantor is estopped to deny the recital in his original deed, but probably the remote assignee would be allowed to show a real consideration greater than stated in the deed. 3 Sedg. Dam. (8th ed.), 103, (§ 965). Property — Dedication — Estoppel. — Held, that the sale of lots as bounding on an unopened street, apj^earing on the grantor's map, is a complete dedication of that street to the public without acceptance or user, and that the lapse of twenty-three years is not an abandonment. Mayor of Baltimore v. Frick, 'i^'}^ Atl. Rep. 435 (Md.). In general, to create a public right the public must accept the offer by user or other- wise. But in the cases of a dedication by sale of lots with, reference to the grantor's map by the weight of authority the offer is held irrevocable. Trustees, etc. v. Council of Hoboken, 33 N. J. L. 13 ; Meier v. Portland C. Ry. Co., 16 Or. 500 ; Eliot, Roads, 89, 129. Cases of this kind fall into two classes ; (i) where a town site is laid out, and (2) where merely a small parcel of land is divided up. In the first class the purchasers of lots may be said to constitute the public. As the doctrine of irrevocability is rested on estoppel, it would seem to be a question, in the second class of cases more especially, whether the purchasers relied on an offer of the road-bed to the public to be used when occasion should justify it, or whether all they bargained for was a private right of way. See Angell on Highways, § 156. Property — Donatio Causa Mortis. — Testator, on the eve of departure on a journey for his health, handed certificates of stock to his nephew, saying, " I always intended that for you. ... I don't know whether I will ever come back or not. . . I don't think I can get over this disease. ... I can't expect it." The nephew took the certificates and kept them till after the donor's death, which, though it did not occur till his return from the journey, was due to the illness of which he complained. The certificates had no form of assignment indorsed on them. Held, a valid gift causa mortis was shown. Leyson v. J?uvis, 42 Pac. Rep. 775 (Montana). The case is a plain one, as the gift was meant to be complete, the certificates were delivered, and the donor failed to recover from the illness from which he contemplated
