RECENT CASES. 543 of servant and master is made out, a charitable corporation is liable for its servants' negligent acts, — adopting the doctrine of Forema7i v. Mayor 6r'C. Despite Downes v. Hospital, supra, it is generally law then that a cor- poration designed for charitable (or public) purposes is liable for the non-performance of whatever duty may be imposed upon it ; nor is it a sufficient answer to allege that its non-performance was due to its ser- vants' negligence, or that it possessed no funds but those dedicated to carrying out its charitable or public purposes. The exact extent of the duty imposed is often a troublesome question. That difficulty, however, does not affect the liability of a corporation once the duty is determined. But the decisions cited supra show that the question whether, beyond this liability for the non-performance of duty, there is a liability for the negli- gence of the corporation's servants, is still open. The English courts {Fo7'emaji v. Mayor &>€., supra) now decline to recognize any distinction in applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to charitable and to busi- ness corporations. Yet this doctrine has never been sustained on satisfac- tory grounds ; it has been vigorously assailed at times (see Parliamentary Blue Book on the Employers' Liability Bill, 1877 : testimony of Bramwell and Brett, L. JJ., pp. 58, 59, 115, 119), and is questioned in Pollock on Torts, 2d edition, 69, 70. It may be well doubted, therefore, whether it should be extended to the case of charitable corporations, where it is more likely to impair than to secure substantial justice. The Connecticut Supreme Court in the last decided case on the point {Hearns v. Water- bury Hospital, 33 Atl. Rep 595), after a careful and exhaustive considera- tion of authorities, has refused to make such an extension. The outcome of a similar case, at present awaiting decision in the New Hampshire Supreme Court, will be watched with interest. Of course if, in certain circumstances, a charitable corporation can be said to be a servant of the public in the sense that an officer of state is such a servant, the doctrine of respofideat superior is inapplicable on other grounds. RECENT CASES. Agency — Libel — Liability of Managing Editor of Newspaper. — Held, where the managing editor of a newspaper is also an officer of the corporation owning the paper, he is equally liable with the publisher and proprietor for the consequences of a libellous publication, and mere want of knowledge on his part is no defence, since it is his business to know. Smith v. Utiey, 65 N. W. Rep. 744 (Wis.). If in this case the libellous matter actually passed through the hands of the managing editor to those employed in the actual work of printing, there is no question of his liability. It is a positive act, like a trespass on land. But assuming that it did not so happen, the case turns on the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance. Did the editor by assuming his position so interfere, and play such an active part, that he became responsible to third persons for the careful conduct of the paper. It seems difficult to say that he did not, and yet it has been held that a general agent, having control of real estate, cannot be held for injuries received from the falling of a door on account of its being out of repair. Baird v. Shipman, 132 111, 16. The fact that the editor here was an officer of the corporation has no bearing on the matter. Agency — When Knowledge of Agent is Knowledge of Principal. — Where the agent of an insurance company has acquired knowledge of outstanding
