check, an accord and satisfaction is fairly shown. Plaintiff had no business to keep and use the check otherwise than on the conditions on which it was sent. As the court aptly puts it, " When he indorsed and collected the check referred to in the letter asking him to sign the enclosed receipt in full, it was the same, in legal effect, as if he had signed and returned the receipt, because acceptance of the check was a conclusive election to be bound by the condition upon which the check was offered." 2 Parsons on Contracts, 8th ed., p. *687 and note t, has a discussion of the subject. In connection with this subject it is interesting to note a case just decided ni Michigan, where plaintiff, having received a sum for wages minus the amount of a railway fare, which defendant expressly refused to allow, and having given a receipt in full was held thereafter precluded from successfully suing on the claim for the fare, though both parties admitted the sum actually paid to be due so far as it went. Tanner v. Merrill, 65 N. W. Rep. 664 (Mich.). Two judges dissent, on the ground that payment of a debt admittedly due is no considerationfor a discharge of a further claim. But as the two claims were not separate, and the payment and receipt were given for a lump amount which was unliquidated, the case would seem to be analogous to the New York case.
Contracts — Illegality. — The plaintiff and defendant had entered into a part- nership to carry on certain faro and crap games. The plaintiff now sues for his share of the proceeds in the hands of his partner. Held, that where the illegal contract has been carried out, the illegality of the contract is not a bar to calling the partner who holds the profits to account. McDonald v. Lund, 43 Pac. Rep. 348 (Wash.).
The decision in this case is carefully reasoned out and well supported by authorities cited, yet it does not appear sound. The plaintiffs claim is founded on the contract, and allowing a recovery is carrying the contract into effect. The better mode of dealing with such cases is to leave the parties remediless. The vice of the contract enters into the settlement, and the law should interfere to aid neither when both are in pari delicto. Dixon v. Olmstead, 9 Vt. 310; Embrey v. Jenison, 131 U. S. 336; Harvey v. Merrill, 150 Mass. i ; 2 Parsons on Contracts, 8th ed. p..*747, and cases cited.
Contracts—Public Policy—Agreement to Waive Claim for Negligence.— — Where an employee joins a voluntary relief association to which he contributes, and his employers guarantee the obligations, pay the operating expenses, make up deficits in the fund, supply surgical attendance, etc., an agreement by him in his voluntary application for membership that acceptance of benefits from the association for an injury shall operate as a waiver of his claim for damages, is not void as against public policy. Otis v. Pennsylvania Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 136.
Where under a similar agreement he elects to accept aid from the association in ignorance of the strength of his claim against the company, it was held in another recent case that the effect of his election, in barring an action against the company, is not avoided. Vickers v. C. B. & Q. P. R., 71 Fed. Rep. 139.
Both decisions are amply supported by the authorities cited. It is the election given to the employee either to receive aid from the association or to sue the company, that removes the objection that the contract is one to avoid liability for one's own negligence. Contracts of the latter class are of course void. Roesner v. Hermann, 8 Fed. Rep. 782; Runt v. Herring, 21 N. Y. Supp. 244.
Contracts—The Powers of College Authorities.—Plaintiff, who had been expelled from defendants' college, brought an action for breach of contract, alleging that the expulsion was unlawful. Held, that the relation between a student and his college is not contractual, that there was no ground for judicial interference, and that plaintiff's only remedy was by appeal to the Visitor. Green v. Master and Fellows of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, 31 Law Journal, 119. See Notes.
Corporations — Liability of Charitable Corporation for Negligence of its Servants.—Held, a charitable corporation (in this case a hospital) is not liable for injuries to a patient due to negligent treatment by the physicians and nurses in its employ where it has exercised due care in their selection. Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 33 Atl. Rep. 595 (Conn.). See Notes.
Corporations—Misappropriation by Directors.—Held, that one who holds stock as collateral may maintain a bill against the directors whose misappropriation impairs his security. Green v. Hedenberg, 42 N. E. Rep. 851 (111.).
An English case decided in 1852 held that a cestui que trust of shares in a railway could, by joining its trustee, maintain a bill against the directors alleging certain illegal acts were in contemplation. Ry. v. Rushout, 5 De G. & S. 290. In 1879 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that an action would lie by pledgees of stock against the directors, not in the name of the corporation, but directly to protect their own interest against a breach of trust. Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43. The principal case follows this latter decision without comment.
