sounding officers or soldiers, were to be arrested, and if not amenable to martial law, were to be delivered over to the civil authorities.
The orders were remarkable chiefly for the power they trusted in the hands of Wilkinson, and the confidence they showed in his good faith. Yet nothing could on its face be more suspicious than his report. The idea that Burr's expedition could be directed against Vera Cruz was unreasonable, and contrary to the tenor of the President's information from all other sources.[1] A moment's thought should have satisfied the President that Wilkinson was deceiving him, and that the city of New Orleans must be the real point of danger. In truth, Wilkinson's letters suppressed more than they told, and were more alarming than the warnings of Eaton or of Daveiss; for they proved that Wilkinson was playing a double part. No measure that promised safety could be taken which would not require an instant removal of Wilkinson and a vigorous support of Claiborne at New Orleans.
Nov. 27, 1806, the same day with Dearborn's letter, the proclamation was issued.[2] Without mentioning Burr's name, it announced that sundry persons were conspiring against Spain, contrary to the laws; it warned all persons whatsoever to withdraw from such conspiracy; and it directed all offi-
