Syllabus
That conclusion follows also from this Court’s precedent. See AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649–650.
Archer & White’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, its argument that §§3 and 4 of the Act should be interpreted to mean that a court must always resolve questions of arbitrability has already been addressed and rejected by this Court. See, e. g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U. S. 938, 944. Second, its argument that §10 of the Act–which provides for back-end judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision if an arbitrator has “exceeded” his or her “powers”–supports the conclusion that the court at the front end should also be able to say that the underlying issue is not arbitrable is inconsistent with the way Congress designed the Act. And it is not this Court’s proper role to redesign the Act. Third, its argument that it would be a waste of the parties’ time and money to send wholly groundless arbitrability questions to an arbitrator ignores the fact that the Act contains no “wholly groundless” exception. This Court may not engraft its own exceptions onto the statutory text. Nor is it likely that the exception would save time and money systemically even if it might do so in some individual cases. Fourth, its argument that the exception is necessary to deter frivolous motions to compel arbitration overstates the potential problem. Arbitrators are already capable of efficiently disposing of frivolous cases and deterring frivolous motions, and such motions do not appear to have caused a substantial problem in those Circuits that have not recognized a “wholly groundless” exception.
The Fifth Circuit may address the question whether the contract at issue in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator, as well as other properly preserved arguments, on remand. Pp. 4–8.
878 F. 3d 488, vacated and remanded.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
