Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/112

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HERESIES OF SEA POWER

to either side. Had Captain Roudineff, of the Variag, been a man of genius there is little doubt but that, in view of the lack of caution displayed by the Japanese Admiral Uryu in his attack, he might have accomplished something. As it was, he seems never to have attempted anything serious.

Before this event occurred Admiral Togo had acted elsewhere. On the night of February 8–9th, he sent his destroyers to attack the Russian fleet lying outside Port Arthur, a dangerous place to lie in, but necessitated by the fact that the Port Arthur entrance was so small and the fleet so inefficient that it had to collect outside because it could not emerge on a single tide. War had been officially declared about six o'clock on the evening of the 8th, but this information was (so it is said) suppressed by Admiral Alexieff, and many Russian officers were on shore. Only one Russian ship, the cruiser Bayan, appears to have been in any way prepared for war.

Owing to mishaps incidental to torpedo attacks, only one division of Japanese destroyers delivered an attack. Two first-class battleships and one cruiser were hit, and the surprise was so complete that the Russians never even fired till the Japanese boats were gone. It now seems established that the surprise was effected through the Japanese destroyers being taken for Russian boats—Russian signals being imitated, a perfectly legitimate war ruse concerning which the Russians subsequently protested very unreasonably.