forces combined were slightly superior to the Japanese: divided they were inferior. Japan's solution of the problem was to annihilate the intermediate unit with a detachment and then fling her whole force on the Port Arthur fleet. At a later date she modified this: first making a considerable show off Vladivostok and then lying between with two divisions, each facing a Russian division, and these fought separate actions each with its own enemy in the affairs of August, 1904. The loss of the Bayan at Port Arthur and the Bogatyr at Vladivostok (both matters of chance) gave the Japanese a better force than they would otherwise have had at both points, but this paper advantage was not very great and Togo's fleet at Round Island, for reasons hereinafter stated, was hardly superior to the Russian Port Arthur fleet under Witgeft. Kamimura had a distinct superiority in his division; but he had it at Togo's expense.
The results were in favour of both Japanese divisions, though fully conclusive in neither case.
This is the only instance of the problem (except in naval manoeuvres) since Captain Mahan wrote[1]: —
'A position . . . threatened with attack from two quarters, presents one of the subtlest temptations to a commander. The impulse is very strong to meet both by dividing his own numbers . . . but unless in possession of overwhelming force it is an error, exposing both divisions to be beaten separately.'
- ↑ Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 113.
