who attacked them there did so quite successfully. The Romans under Scipio Africanus so lay at Tunis, and the results were indecisive, with the balance of success to the attacking Carthaginians.
The Octavian fleet so lying off the Campanian coast was defeated by the ships of Pompey; and at Actium the fleet of Antony very similarly disposed was defeated.
Coming to more modern times we find that in the eighteenth century it was a tactical axiom with the French that a fleet moored in battle order with its flanks protected by batteries was immune from attack. For this they had immediate historical warrant. Professor Laughton[1] cites a variety of instances of this doctrine in action. D'Estaing twice declined to attack an inferior British fleet so lying and was beaten later at St. Lucia when he did attempt it—his twelve big ships being beaten by seven smaller English vessels.[2]
Guichen and Cordova with thirty-six ships feared to attack Darby so placed with twenty at Torbay; and De Grasse attacking Hood, anchored at St. Kitts, failed. Suffren with twelve ships off Madras declined to attack Hughes with nine anchored and supported by batteries.
So when the French fleet thus lay before the battle
