fore, surely a grave error, condoned only by the lucky chance that Rogestvensky proved easy to defeat at Tsushima. Is not the hostile base rather than the hostile fleet the true objective of modern naval war?
The importance of bases is usually fully recognised afloat: indeed it is afloat that all the apostles of what—for want of a better term—may be called 'Base Power' are to be found.
In the days of sailing ships the base was almost non-essential. Six months' stores were carried, and the base was necessary merely for powder, shot and spars. Powder and shot were, however, easily to be found anywhere and did not need frequent replenishing, while any forest almost was able to's apply spars. In the matter of spare sails any merchant ship could be commandeered, consequently a fleet was able to extemporise bases anywhere. Orthodox bases, at the same time, were easily defended and made impregnable and liable to no dangers save that of blockade—tedious work for which few navies were fitted. The hostile fleet was the only objective. Base attacks were rarely if ever attempted later than the seventeenth century—practically they ceased to be made long before that except in exceptional circumstances. Generally speaking the base was impregnable.
To-day hardly an impregnable base exists, though by courtesy nearly all bases are so styled. Actual impregnability is conferred only by the existence of a fleet, which, in its relation to a base exactly reproduces
