would accept inevitable and rapid defeat, whereas by a guerre de course it prolongs operations very considerably and knows that before going under it will do some damage. Can we conclude, therefore, that the guerre de course is other than logical for the weaker side?
The best—being the simplest and least confused—instance of the application of a guerre de course is to be found in the Chili-Peruvian War of 1879–1881. In this conflict the two principal Peruvian ships were entirely unfitted to meet the two principal Chilians—a 'grand battle' would have been a foregone conclusion. The possibility of taking the Chilians in detail offered no prospects, since the two Peruvians together were barely equal to one Chilian. Also, one of them, the Independencia, was lost at once, and so the effective Peruvian force was reduced to the turret-ship Huascar.
Peru, therefore, in adopting the guerre de course did the only thing that promised a prolongation of the naval war. The Chilian coast was harried, a Chilian army in the north cut off from its base through the interception of transports, and generally damage was inflicted almost as though no Chilian Fleet existed. Of course the end came at last. The Huascar was caught in Angamos Bay and after a fine fight captured. But what would it have availed Peru had she accepted that battle in the beginning instead of at the end? As things were, much mischief was inflicted, and once at least the Huascar in her depredatory course
