such excitement in Japan that Togo would have been compelled to split his fleet to hunt for them; in which case the Russian battleships might have found some opportunity. Of course, this splitting would have been rather in the category of things hoped for than things to be expected: still it is a possibility of a vigorous guerre de course, and Japanese 'Fitness to win' would have been the only bulwark against it.
There is a reverse side to the shield. The Russians may have desired to attempt some such strategy but failed to see any prospect of getting out on account of the Togo blockade; certainly the answer to it was a rigorous blockade. But to force Togo into accepting the dangers and risk of a close blockade would certainly have been more effective than allowing him to maintain a loose blockade such as sufficed to meet the actual situation.
However, there was no guerre de course proper, and the only modern instance of it is the Chili-Peruvian War already mentioned. Let us now investigate the past and see whether history has anything that bears upon the matter.
Ancient history does not record any characteristic guerre de course: the grand battle sufficed for the ancients' simple aspirations. Combatants of those days were fully persuaded of the advisability of that doctrine, of which Captain Mahan has been the modern apostle, that all sea dominion depends upon the issue of the grand battle. The Peloponnesians beaten by
