conducted was a mild sort of affair; at any rate not the most serious that a nation might encounter. Whatever it was, the Dutch met it by proceeding to the English Coast and the Thames. They wasted little or no strength in chasing the English commerce destroyers—the 'Earths' were their objective.
A more serious guerre de course was carried on by the French in their war with England in 1702–12. The Channel and North Sea were covered with privateers, which, however, were unsupported by big fleets and so very liable to capture. Yet the damage done to British shipping was very great indeed. Again in a later war the same policy was pursued. In the four years ending in June 1760, 2,500 English merchantmen had been captured with the loss of 242 privateers. Approximately the 'life' of a privateer was ten British ships.
It has been shown by Captain Mahan that under these conditions British trade prospered and increased: and when the war ended, it was to England's advantage in both cases. But in neither instance can the French system be fairly described as guerre de course proper. This should be borne in mind: because the essential to a successful or partially successful guerre de course is that its infliction of greater losses than have been anticipated, shall so break up and disconcert the stronger sea Power trying to overcome it, that the weaker naval Power shall be able to use its battle fleet with some prospect of success. That is the dangerous
