also the error made in not stopping egress in the first place from neutral harbours. Had the North devoted greater attention to this question, it is probable that the Southern campaign would have been less successful than it was.
All this has been said before to-day: indeed, points have been strained to show that commerce attack besides being incapable of anything save negative results so far as the success or otherwise of the war is concerned is not necessarily serious in its effects.
On the whole, even though history shows the American Civil War to be almost the only instance of really disastrous results following commerce attack, it is probably extremely dangerous to under-estimate its danger—certainly for a nation situated as the British, whose over-sea trade constitutes the means of existence. Always it must be remembered that— save in the very small case of Chili and Peru—the real guerre de course has never been attempted. A corsair war having results such as the Southern War against commerce would be absolutely fatal to the United Kingdom—and nothing is gained by attempts to minimise it.
The guerre de course must, therefore, be prepared against: and that, too, not a partial and immature attempt such as history only records, but a really scientific guerre de course based on the fact that this form of war is the best for the weaker Power, and that it may be definitely adopted to split the stronger Power's fleets and efforts, because the result of things
