Dutch against the English, has far more to recommend it than any scheme resting on a negative defence.
A final word may be added about convoys. These in the old days were rarely very successful: the principal problem being the difficulty of keeping the merchantmen together. That difficulty would probably be still greater to-day. Moreover, unless the enemy's ports are sufficiently blockaded to prevent the egress of anything but isolated ships, a convoy merely offers in these days of telegraphs and full information a splendid prize already prepared for the enemy. The trade loss of waiting for convoy is also probably considerable — convoy must, therefore, be regarded as a very heavy insurance.
National insurance is probably a better system; as under it the suffering shipowner would have no cause to rouse plaints, and so there would be nothing to interfere with the maintenance of that vigorous offensive by the Navy in which the surest salvation lies. It cannot too frequently or emphatically be laid down that for success the Navy must be unhampered with popular plans, and it must be free to leave commerce to look after itself for a while should the need and occasion arise.
For a nation to exhibit the necessary patience and confidence in such circumstances (on a small scale Japan in 1904–5 is an example) requires the existence of that quality which elsewhere has been described as
