on the ground that it is likely to break adrift and damage its own side; but the obvious thing to do with it if laid at all is to lay it on some illegal and, therefore, less to be expected spot.
From all of which it is abundantly clear that International Law is an effective law only so far as the weaker is concerned—the strong nations obeying it or enforcing it only so far as such action suits their necessities or the expediency of the case. In theory International Law rests for its action on public opinion. In practice, the value of public opinion is a small factor. If the United States Fleet—for instance—outraged International Law in war, public opinion in the United States would be with the Fleet and not with the Law. Similarly opinion in England—assuming that sympathy with the United States, which would exist in almost any war in which America might be engaged—would be a considerably more powerful factor than any regard for the letter of the Law. Throughout the world generally only those nations which were anti-American to commence with would possess a public opinion at all in favour of the enforcement of the Law. It would, in fine, be simply a vehicle for the expression of self-interest.
An interesting example of this sort of thing in operation was afforded by the Russo-Japanese war. Coal was shipped to either belligerent. The illegality of supplying coal to Russia was much discussed, but nothing was said about coal supplied at the self-same
