this summary, they believe that they have thrown sufficient light upon the causes and the consequences of the incident in question, and at the same time upon the responsibilities resulting therefrom.
2. On October 7/20, 1904, the second Russian squadron of the Pacific Fleet, under the chief command of Vice-Admiral Aide-de-Camp General Rogestvensky, anchored near Cape Skagen with the intention of taking in coal before continuing its voyage to the Far East.
It appears, according to the deposition made, that from the time when the squadron left the roadstead of Reval, Admiral Rogestvensky had caused the vessels under his command to adopt minute precautions, with the object of placing them fully in a position to repel an attack by torpedo-boats during the night, either at sea or when anchored.
These precautions seem to be justified by the information frequently sent by the agents of the Imperial Government respecting hostile attempts that were to be apprehended, and which in all probability would take the form of attacks by torpedo-boats.
Furthermore, during his stay at Skagen, Admiral Rogestvensky had been informed of the presence of suspicious vessels off the Norwegian coast. Besides, he had learned from the captain of the transport Bakan, who had come from the north, that on the night before he had seen four torpedo-boats, which had only a single light at the masthead,
