towns without notice for non-combatants to withdraw. Common humanity would compel such a course in forty-nine cases out of fifty; in the fiftieth, a cruisercaptain, undeterred by humanity in a chance to wreak destruction with no time to wait, would hardly be deterred by any law upon the matter.
And so all through. In practically every case laws as to the conduct of naval war are superfluous either because ordinary humanity already forbids or else because expediency would in any case counsel a similar course. Laws may now and again be useful perhaps in enabling an officer of the skilful sea-lawyer type to know exactly how far he can impose upon a neutral without creating a casus belli, but the stronger man may be relied upon to guide his actions only by expediency, like Togo in the Naniwa when he sank the Kowshing. He will be a very poor naval officer who throws away any chance of damaging the enemy on account of legal considerations. The enemy may esteem his moral rectitude, but that is about all the esteem that he will earn. Even if complications are likely to follow upon his performing an illegal act in order to destroy the enemy, his duty demands that he shall still proceed to destroy. If the worst comes to the worst his country can always 'disavow the action after its accomplishment.' He may or may not be punished for it, but in any case he will have done his clear duty to his country by destroying the enemy, which, had he been more law-abiding, he would not
