have been lost, because it would have been impossible to conceal so momentous an event.'
So far so good. It is possible, though not very probable, that non-concealment of the loss of the Yashima might have caused some abstentions from a Japanese Loan, but it is absolutely certain that no war gains resulted from it. The Russians were perfectly aware that the ship was hors de combat if not sunk, and if the concealment had any military value at all the Russians were the gainers, since they may well have argued that the secrecy was an effort to hide from them that they were getting the better of the naval war. Certainly it could never have conveyed to them the impression that they were being worsted.
It was no benefit to Japan for her people to feel that they were told only of victories and nothing of defeats—the logical result of rumours which could not be suppressed. In the case of Japan such suppression seems not to have been actually injurious, though the public disappointment at the peace terms which manifested itself in some rioting, may suggest that Russia was popularly supposed to be more crushed than was actually the case. A press ignorant of the exact progress of the Japanese arms was perhaps by its comments the first cause of the riots.
The ill results of secrecy were, however, in this case not really serious to Japan; but suppose her to have suffered serious reverses and other losses which were concealed, sufficient, let us say, to make it necessary
