did. Torpedoes have been avoided—but rarely; whereas the history of the ram is the history of its being avoided. The fire-ship had not the mobility of the ship it attacked: the torpedo-boat and the torpedo have both a speed advantage. These differences are everything. Many learned articles have been written to prove that the torpedo menace is much exaggerated; but the writers have not had to face torpedo attack. The torpedo menace kept Ito from following the Chinese fleet after the Yalu; it drove Togo away at the battle of Round Island, it rendered Rogestvensky helpless at Tsushima. 'The sea was full of torpedo-boats. We might sink one, two or three, but of what avail with dozens more to come?' Thus wrote a Russian of that great battle. Of course the Russians lacked boats of their own with which to neutralise the Japanese boats, due perhaps to their having lent too ready an ear to those who preached that the torpedo menace was exaggerated, and the situation may have been to that degree unique. But still the torpedo menace exists. It colours all ideas of strategy, it is remembered in all tactical plans, so that academical discussions as to its exact actual value matter very little. There still remains the fact that to-day two weapons exist where practically only one existed before and that the navies of all nations recognise the existence of two weapons, and either hold or are cognisant of the belief that a battleship fleet may be annihilated by a lucky torpedo attack. How often in
