dictory facts. Again, the naval officer cannot weigh the facts without an enormous library.
This, it may be suggested, reduces the value of all theories based on history to our individual appreciation of the theorist. And this means, either that his arguments as placed before us commend themselves to us on our own imperfect knowledge of the facts, or that the theorist has a plausible style that carries us away. Are either of these things rocks on which to build? And if we are without a bed-rock of absolute truth, may we not be building on sand?
Consequently in this work no attempt is made to go into the details of past history. Only the main facts are selected for comparison with accepted theories of Sea Power, and thence is deduced a new theory as to what history really does teach.
A preference for the battles of the days of the oar will be noted. This is due to a conviction that these wars more clearly resemble modern ones than those of the middle period when sail was the supreme motive power. Oar and steam have one great feature in common—independence of the wind. In the sailing days wind was the essential factor. The British ships blockading Brest in the great war could now and again go away, knowing full well that till the wind changed the French could not leave. On this fact schemes were laid which to-day could have no counter-part. In the oar-age, however, there were no such
