Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/52

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HERESIES OF SEA POWER.

general history, we may find other instances of military affairs profoundly influencing Sea Power.

The battle of Cyzicus[1] is of special interest from the tactical standpoint. It took place in the twenty-second year of the war (B.C. 410). The Athenians under Alcibiades were inferior in numbers, and by no means sure of victory. They resorted, therefore, to tactics almost identical with those adopted by Togo off Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese war.

The Athenian fleet was divided into three squadrons, of which only one showed itself. This squadron under Alcibiades being attacked, presently retreated till the Peloponnesians were drawn a long way from their base.

Then at a given signal Alcibiades turned on his straggling pursuers, while the other two squadrons cut off the retreat. A complete victory was the result. Incidentally it may be mentioned that Sparta there-upon sought peace, but the Athenians refused to accept the offers. From the previous Syracusan disaster, however, Athens never fully recovered, although fresh ships subsequently won battles such as Cyzicus over opponents unduly flushed with the Syracusan victory. But the Athenian naval prestige was gone, destroyed by what was after all a military operation, even as the Athenian fleet was finally so destroyed at the battle of Ægospotami. Here the Athenian fleet, deceived by a clever but fairly obvious strategy, was lulled into a false

  1. Xenophon, Hellenica, i. 1. Cf. Diod. Sic. XIII. 50-51.