enough, and it may be legitimate so to look upon it. Again, Ægospotarni may be regarded as a huge instance of what was a common war object in those days, catching the enemy on the beach.
Yet still the 'other ways' remain, still to Athens belonged the splendid navy, the well-trained crews, the competent seamen and all the things that go to make up Sea Power; to her victorious opponents an inferior navy, incompetent seamen, less proficiency in every branch.
Viewed in any light, it is hard, indeed, to find fault with Athenian strategy. Were any student of Sea Power, ignorant of the history of the war, given its conditions, the forces, and shown the Athenian movements, the last thing he would prophesy would be the thing that befel. Except the Syracusan expedition hardly anything could be criticised, and even that expedition has much to be said for its wisdom. It transferred the war from Attica to Sicily, it promised the essential expansion and refilled coffers; it was precisely the sort of operation that command of the sea is valuable as permitting. Even the landing at Ægospotami is excusable: since it was the invariable custom and necessity of the time.
The war is a little-studied war; Ægospotaini is seldom mentioned like Lepanto and Trafalgar: if mentioned at all, the lessons drawn only concern incompetent strategy, careless neglect, and other hard criticisms such as the actual conditions scarcely merit.
