Carthage, her own citizens being indisposed to military service, had a weak point in her mercenary troops, who, devoid of any national interest in her campaigns, were reliable only while victory and plunder were to be secured upon the Carthaginian side. If defeat were toward, there was no race feeling in the rank and file to compel the continuation of war:[1] but history shows that the Carthaginians were not ignorant of what might be done to mitigate this peril by means of discipline.
Rome was essentially a military power. Wherever the Roman arms penetrated there a miniature Rome was set up, bound to Rome by ties of self-interest, and gradually all Italy had fallen under her sway. Her
- ↑ On the whole question, cp. the following criticism of Pelham: 'The chief dangers for Carthage lay obviously in the jealousy exhibited at home of her officers abroad, in the difficulty of controlling her mercenary troops, and in the ever-present possibility of disaffection among her subjects in Libya—dangers which even the genius of Hannibal failed finally to surmount.' —Pelham, p.109.
her sea empire. The same lesson may be found in the fall of the Athenian sea empire. Theoretically, and actually perhaps in peace time, for the fleet to be an arm of the body politic may be a sound system; but the almost inevitable conflict between civil and naval control of the fleet in war time may have most disastrous results. It is almost absolutely certain that in the next great naval war in which the British fleet is engaged, the civil element will demand (either of its own accord or from pressure of public opinion) that the fleet protects trade first and attempts to destroy the enemy afterwards. Similarly the certain naval attitude will be 'Destroy the enemy and thus put it out of his power to injure trade.' The chief result of the conflict of the two theories will probably be that neither object is effectually accomplished—a heavy price to pay for asserting the principle of Parliamentary control of the navy.
