navy matched against a notoriously untrained sea force. Yet always in history most danger has come from the despised untrained force—a lesson England learned in her war with the Americans in 1812.
After this victory of Duilius the newly acquired Sea Power of Rome was used to press the Sicilian campaign and for operations against Corsica and Sardinia. Hannibal with what was left of his fleet went from Carthage to Sardinia which was being attacked, and here in a certain harbour the Romans found and blockaded him. His crews fled to the shore and abandoned their ships. He himself escaped only to fall into the hands of some of his own men, who signalised their view of his second failure by crucifying him forthwith.[1]
The loss of the fleet of Hannibal did not exhaust Carthaginian naval resources, for in the following year (B.C. 256) they had a fleet off Tyndaris[2] under Hamilcar which, passing in bad order, was sighted by the Roman Atilius who lay at anchor in the harbour. He rushed to the attack with ten triremes leaving the rest of his fleet to follow. These ten were surrounded and nine of them destroyed; when the rest of the Romans arrived and captured or destroyed eighteen Carthaginians.
To the ancient historian this action was an example of Roman temerity and over-confidence that culminated
