Page:Hill v. State.pdf/11

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614
CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT
[23 Ark.

Hill ex. vs. the State.
[December

State (where she is not named,) as there are expressed exceptions in favor of women laboring under the legal disability of coverture, infants and insane persons, who are supposed to be incapable of attending to their interests, etc., and there are good reasons why these reservations should be made.

But the administration statute, contemplating, as we have seen, a speedy settlement of all demands, and a distribution of the remainder of the estate to legatees and distributees, within a prescribed time after grant of letters, in fixing the period in which demands are to be presented, has, consistently with the policy of the act, made no reservation in favor of married women, infants, insane persons, etc., and the courts can make none. The policy of the statute is, that the course of administration and distribution shall not be prolonged and confused by the coming in of claims out of time; and there is no good reason why the policy which excludes demands due to the helpless persons above mentioned, if not presented within the time prescribed by the statute, should not also bar the claims of the State exhibited for allowance out of time.

In Mississippi, where the statute limiting the time for exhibiting demands against the estates of deceased persons, is treated as a mere statute of limitation. (5 S. & M. 651; 7 ib. 441), it has been held that the statute does not run against the State. Parntilee vs. McNutt, Gov., etc., 41 S. & M. 183.

So in United States vs. Hoar, 2 Mason 311, Judge Story appears to have treated the statute of Massachusetts, limiting suits against executors and administrators, as of the nature of the general statute of limitations, and applied the old English maxim, nullum tempus occurrit regi, etc.

But in The State vs. Crutcher ad., 2 Swan 504, in a well considered case by Mr. Justice McKinney, the distinction between the general statute of limitations and the statute of non-claim of Tennessee, is pointed out, and it is held, upon a construction of that statute, and other statutes construed in connection with it, that demands due the State are barred by the statute of nonclaim, if not presented within the time limited, etc.