the privilege of securing for their respective countries the most favourable terms.
The great obstacle would still be the English conquest. The majority of Henry's advisers were of opinion that enough had been done for the honour of England. They had taken Boulogne; they had proved that it could not be wrested from them by force; but it was not worth to them the expense of further contention. 'If we leave it now,' said Gardiner,[1] 'we shall win this opinion, that we might do what we list, were it not for respect that the King's Majesty hath for Christendom. In this opinion we be abroad in the world now; and this opinion may be maintained by a peace. I esteem nothing Boulogne in comparison of the mastery we have won in keeping it and defending of our realm alone.' The Duke of Norfolk was led by his French sympathies to the same conclusion; and the King was all but alone in maintaining an opposite view. With the evidence in his hands of the bad faith of the Continental powers, he trusted as much to the substantial thing which he had grasped as to the sentiments which might be entertained of him. He had felt the value of a 'Milan for the French King,' which he could play off against the Emperor; and the power of restitution was a card which he preferred to retain in his hand. Lord Surrey, who was now with the garrison at Guisnes, took the same side; but rather, it was thought, because he was crippled with debt, and believed that, if the war lasted, he might
- ↑ State Papers, vol. x. p. 664.
