130 HISTORY OF GREECE. gus, and indeed even enlarged its powers, we may infer that his grand object was, not to weaken the oligarchy generally, but to improve the administi ation and to repress the misconduct and irregularities of the individual archons ; and that too, not by diminishing their powers, but by making some degree of popu- larity the condition both of their entry into office, and of their safety or honor after it. It is, in my judgment, a mistake to suppose that Solon trans- ferred the judicial power of the archons to. a popular dikastery ; these magistrates still continued self-acting judges, deciding and condemning without appeal, not mere presidents of an as- sembled jury, as they afterwards came to be during the next century. 1 For the general exercise of such power they were ac- countable after their year of office ; and this accountability was the security against abuse, a very insufficient security, yet not wholy inoperative. It will be seen, however, presently, that these archons, though strong to coerce, and perhaps to oppress, small and poor men, had no means of keeping down rebellious ' The statement of Plutarch, that Solon gave an appeal from the decision of the archon to the judgment of the popular dikastery (Plutarch, Solon, 18), is distrusted by most of the expositors, though Dr. Thirlwall seems to admit it, justifying it by the analogy of the ephetae, or judges of appeal, constituted by Drako (Hist, of Greece, vol. ii, ch. xi, p. 46). To me it appears that the Drakonian cphctse were not really judges in appeal : but be that as it may, the supposition of an appeal from the judg- ment of the archon is inconsistent with the known course of Attic procedure, and has apparently arisen in Plutarch's mind from confusion with the Roman provocatio^ which really was an appeal from the judgment of the consul to that of the people. Plutarch's comparison of Solon with Publicola leads to this suspicion, Kal roif Qevyovai SIKTJV, k-xiKah,Eia-&ai rbv dr/fiov, uanep 6 I,O?MV Toiif diKaa-uf, tduice (Publicola). The Athenian archon was first a judge without appeal ; and afterwards, ceasing to be a iudge, he became president of a dikastcry, performing only those preparatory steps which brought the case to an issue fit for decision : but he does not seem ever to have been a judge subject to appeal. It is hardly just to Plutarch to make him responsible for the absurd remark that Solon rendered his laws intentionally obscure, in order that the dikasts might have more to do and greater power: he gives the remark, himself, only with the saving expression Myerai, " it is said;" and we may well doubt whether it was ever seriously intended even by it* author, who- ever he may have been.
