370 fflSTORY OF GREECE. ing any opponent fo reply ; and in this instance, the hard fate of Miltiades has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy, it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series ot painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism. What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estima- tion of Miltiades ; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms ; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behavior in the expedition of Pares was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other: what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendency over their minds to in- duce them to follow him without knowing -whither, in the confi- dence of an unknown booty : he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge : in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such be- havior, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, mu*t have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings oi' his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confi- dence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom ; and we may well understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment, without accusing the Athenians of fickleness. If an officer, whose conduct has been such as to merit the highest encomiums, comes on a sudden to betray his trust, and manifests cowardice or treachery in a new and important undertaking confided to him, are we to treat the general in command as fickle, because his opinion as well as his conduct undergoes an instantaneous revolution, which will be all the more vehement in proportion to his previous esteem ? The question to be determined is, vihelher there be s'.fficient grour d for Mich a change ; anl in the
