74 mSTORY OF GREECE. thus brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whoiu he had been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring it all under his (Menon's) com- mand, into the service of the satrap. Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus ; who, jealous in the extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by bidding still high- er himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name and dismiss him. 1 Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another im- pression deeply fixed in his mind ; that the salvation of the army was hopeless without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, since the latter had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile. 2 Notwithstanding these two great mistakes, one on the pres- ent occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus, both committed by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great misfortune to the army ; while, on the contrary, the re moval of Menon was a signal benefit, perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man so treacherous and unprincipled as Xen- ophon depicts Menon, would probably have ended by really com- mitting towards the army that treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in reference to the seizure of the generals. The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hope- less position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away, the spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward march, including the passage of the Euphrates, left undefended ; next, the long trench dug across the 1 Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28. * Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7 ; ii, 5, 9.
