BATTLES OF PLATAa AND MYKALE. 157. that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, " for foregoing desertion and breach of promise, — the ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter, — who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never liear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all : five thousand Lacedaemonian Perioeki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also de- spatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Pelopon- nesian cities followed the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan Pausanias. It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret cor- respondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the mai'ch of the Spartans beyond their own borders.^ We may reasonably doubt whether they ever made such a promise : but at any rate, the suddenness of the march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from fulfilling it ; and they were forced to content themselves with apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general number could have been all suddenly collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi, p. 366) suspects the correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is more probable than anything -which we can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all depended on the five ephors ; there was no public discussion or criti- cism. Kow the conduct of these ephors is consistent and intelligible, — though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think, with Dr. Thirlwall. that the manner of communication ultimately adopted is of the nature of a jest. ' Herodot ix, 12
