pressure or stratagem, on the part of Athens.[1] But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion ol danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient, — but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens, by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in propor- tion as the vigorous resolves of Athens[2] were less and less par- alyzed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod ; so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.
Under such circumstances several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute, — and averse to con- tinuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede, but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, i-e- pressed their attempts one after the other, — conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters ; which was the more easily done,
