KESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS. 68 that the Athenians dared to stay and fight against immense odds: the/, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and for- wardness whereby it was enabled to succeed,i as will appear farther in the sequel. But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognize some one commanding state, and with regard to the land-force no one dreamed of contesting the preeminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her preten- sions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only six- teen ships, and little or no nautical skill ; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and sea- men. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land : but the ma- jority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honor of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force, at this moment of peril, would be compromised.^ To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of preeminence was among the most prominent at- tributes of the Hellenic character : a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honor and glory, is per- haps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen. We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resist- ance, — prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive, — fur- persons whom Herodotus addressed are those who were so full of admira- tion for Sparta, as to ascribe to her chiefly the honor of having beaten back the Persians ; and to maintain that, even without the aid of Athens, the Spartans and Peloponnesians both could have defended, and would have defended, the isthmus of Corinth, fortified as it was by a wall built ex- pressly. The Peloponnesian allies of that day forgot that they were open to attack by sea as well as by land. ^ Herodot. vii, 139. iT^o/xevoi 6e rf/v 'EXXu6a -rvepiecvai. e?i,EV&epTiv, roiiro Td EiTJirjViKov ttuv rb Zot^dv, offov fifi e/j.fi6i(je, avrol ovTOi ^aav ol hTzeyei- pavTEg, Koi jBaaiXea //era ye ■deoiig avuGajMEVoi.
- Herodot. viii, 2, 3 : compare vii, 161.
